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Collective Dynamic Choice: 
The Necessity of Time Inconsistency†
By Matthew O. Jackson and Leeat Yariv*
We study collective decisions by time-discounting individuals choos-
ing a common consumption stream. We show that with any heteroge-
neity in time preferences, every Pareto efficient and non-dictatorial 
method of aggregating utility functions must be time-inconsistent. We 
also show that decisions made via non-dictatorial voting methods 
are intransitive.(JEL D71, D72, D91)
We make collective decisions of many types in our day-to-day lives: from household savings and consumption decisions, to choosing projects and allo-
cating costs in committees, to deciding on taxes and spending in legislatures. A 
central challenge in making such decisions is that individuals in the collective may 
have heterogeneous preferences, most especially over the timing of consumption or 
expenditure of resources.
This heterogeneity is quite evident in many applications. For instance, in the US 
Congress there is great variance in the tenure of representatives. At the start of the 
113 th Congress, in the House or Senate, respectively,  17 percent or  14 percent had 
no previous experience,  37 percent or  40 percent had between  0–8 years of expe-
rience,  26 percent (in both chambers) had between  8–16 years of experience, and 
20 percent (in both chambers) had over  16 years of service under their belt (see 
Glassman and Wilhelm 2013). To the extent that tenure in a chamber is a proxy 
for a representative’s remaining time in service and, in particular, the likelihood of 
running for reelection, it is reasonable to assume that different tenures would be 
associated with different time preferences when making long-term decisions. As a 
different example, in (heterosexual) households, it is well documented that women 
have significantly higher life expectancies than men in most parts of the world.1 
1 In the United States and the United Kingdom, current estimated life expectancies are  82 years for women and  78 
years for men. Comparable statistics (for women and men, respectively) are  85 and  79 in France and Spain,  74 and  62 
in Russia,  76 and  72 in China,  87 and  80 in Japan,  77 and  70 in Brazil, and  54 and  52 in South Africa. See the United
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Having different survival probabilities per period translates into husbands and wives 
discounting the value of savings at substantially different rates. Indeed, Schaner 
(2015) finds evidence of significant differences in time preferences inside house-
holds in Western Kenya. More generally, the heterogeneity in discount factors may 
be driven by attributes other than age or tenure, such as background, personality, 
health conditions, etc.
In addition, there is another important application of the analysis of collective 
decisions made by agents discounting the future differently. There is growing evi-
dence from neuroscientific investigations that suggests that individual brains engage 
in parallel processing and aggregation of motives. In particular, there is evidence that 
different parts of a brain respond differently to timed rewards.2 From that perspective, 
we may gain insight into individual decision making by examining aggregation of 
heterogeneous preferences corresponding to different “motives” in one’s own mind.
Despite the heterogeneity of decision-making bodies, economic models are usu-
ally built assuming that organizations are representable by “rational” agents who 
have time-consistent and transitive preferences. For example, the neoclassical firm 
is assumed to maximize a time discounted stream of expected profits and represen-
tative consumers are assumed to maximize time discounted streams of consumption. 
This embodies an important time consistency: if an agent prefers a consumption of 
$9 eleven periods from now to a consumption of  $8 ten periods from now, then the 
agent should also prefer  $9 in one period to the consumption of  $8 immediately. 
This means that the agent will not reverse a choice as time passes. This is an import-
ant form of “rationality” that implies, in particular, that an agent will not require 
commitment devices to settle disagreements between different “selves.”
One of our main results shows, however, that very natural procedures for mak-
ing collective dynamic decisions are inherently time-inconsistent, even if the under-
lying individuals are perfectly time-consistent. Thus, presuming representative 
 time-consistent preference is with tremendous loss of generality.
Specifically, consider any group of agents who are each individually 
 time-consistent and who are collectively evaluating a stream of common consump-
tion. Individuals have possibly heterogeneous discount factors and instantaneous 
utility functions that are well-behaved. Preferences are aggregated to a collective 
utility function that satisfies a minimal restriction: that it respect unanimity, or 
Pareto efficiency. That is, whenever everyone agrees that one consumption stream 
is superior to another, the collective utility function exhibits the same preference.3 
We prove that any time-consistent aggregation rule that satisfies this minimal 
restriction must be dictatorial: it must track the preferences of only one of the 
Nations Statistics Division Social Indicators, updated in December 2010. In fact, compounded with the age differ-
ence at marriage, Browning (2000)’s estimates suggest that in Canada the wife of a  65 -year-old man would have, on 
average, an approximately  50 percent longer expected survival horizon than her husband (see also Drefahl 2010).
2 See, for example, McClure et al. (2004, 2007); Glimcher and Rustichini (2004); and Hare, Camerer, and 
Rangel (2009). 
3 For example, if the group evaluates consumption streams as the sum of participants’ utility functions (i.e., a 
utilitarian collective utility function), then this is satisfied, as it would if the group evaluates alternatives according 
to the minimum utility or maximum utility. 
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group’s members. In other words, an aggregation rule that is non-dictatorial and 
respects unanimous choices must be time-inconsistent.
Although we first state this result for common consumption streams, we show 
that it easily extends to quite general formats of consumption—including parts that 
are private, common, or common to some subgroups, and so on; thus allowing out-
comes to be the consequence of, say, group bargaining. Furthermore, since the result 
regards observed ultimate choices of consumption streams, it admits situations in 
which agents can either commit or not to their consumption over time. Regardless of 
the underlying procedure by which choices are taken, whenever ultimate consump-
tion can be evaluated by a collective utility function (or by a planner armed with 
some utility function), our first main result highlights the tension between Pareto 
efficiency, time consistency, and engaging more than one individual in decisions. 
From a policy perspective, non-dictatorial collective choices that are rationalizable 
by some collective utility function either necessitate commitment devices or involve 
reversals over time. Furthermore, when conducting a welfare analysis of intertem-
poral policies, the underlying distribution of preferences should be accounted for: 
estimating “representative preferences” (say, for a household or a firm) may not 
properly reflect the preferences of the individuals.
A natural way to weaken the requirement of time consistency is to consider aggre-
gation rules that can be represented as discounted utility functions with  time-varying 
discount factors. We show that whenever such rules respect unanimity, they cor-
respond to a weighted sum of the individual agents’ utility functions. Therefore, 
combined with results in Jackson and Yariv (2014), whenever non-dictatorial, these 
rules exhibit a specific form of time inconsistency: a present-bias, one of the leading 
time inconsistencies identified from lab and field data.4
Our last results examine other methods of aggregating preferences: via some 
sort of vote by agents. These aggregation methods hinge on ordinal comparisons 
between any two consumption streams rather than on their cardinal evaluation, and 
may be particularly relevant for applications having to do with political governance. 
For example, majority voting is widely used in economic and political contexts, and 
is qualitatively different from aggregation procedures relying on agents’ cardinal 
utility functions. One may conjecture that there would be a “median voter,” who 
might effectively appear as a dictator and determine all decisions because he or she 
would be pivotal. A median voter would be reassuring, since although being a dicta-
tor, the voter would be “representative” of the population. However, as we show, this 
is not the case. If a voting rule satisfies a “local non-dictatorship” condition (chooses 
one consumption stream over another whenever at least  n − 1 agents prefer the first 
to the second), then it must exhibit voting cycles and hence be intransitive.
To summarize, our two main results are:
	 •	 	If	individual	preferences	are	aggregated	via	a	collective	utility	function	that	
is non-dictatorial and respects unanimity, then that collective utility func-
tion must be time-inconsistent.
4 Present-biased preferences correspond to more impatience closer to the present than with respect to delayed 
consumption, see the literature review below. 
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	 •	 	If	 preferences	 are	 aggregated	 via	 any	 voting	 rule	 that	 is	 locally	 non-	
dictatorial, such as majority voting, then the  resulting social welfare order-
ing must exhibit cycles (intransitivities), unless the set of consumption 
streams is severely restricted.
Thus, via either a cardinal or ordinal aggregation method, some collective “irra-
tionality” is necessary: either we must sacrifice time consistency to obtain a cardinal 
ranking, or we must sacrifice transitivity to obtain an ordinal ranking.
Related Literature: Zuber (2011) is the closest paper to ours in terms of our 
first result on the necessity of time inconsistency in aggregating time preferences. 
He shows that a planner can only aggregate preferences in a stationary manner if 
all agents have the same discount factor. Zuber’s result is in a significantly differ-
ent setting: each agent can have an independent and arbitrary consumption stream, 
whereas our focus is on joint decisions in which at least some consumption is com-
mon, and in fact our results hold when all consumption is common.
This is more than a superficial difference. Allowing for separate consumption 
streams allows for an easy conflict of interest among agents as one can directly con-
struct combinations of streams over which there are voting cycles: one can induce 
any preference for any given individual by separately adjusting that agent’s consump-
tion. This is not possible with common consumption streams. With fully common 
consumption streams all agents prefer earlier to later consumption, and preferences 
over two timed levels of consumption can be ordered in terms of agents’ discount 
factors. Thus, to find conflicts among the agents is more subtle. Hence, our proof 
technique is different and novel: adapting results of Koopmans (1960) on individual 
decision making, and showing specific features regarding the richness of common 
consumption streams.5 Commonality of consumption is important for practically all 
of the applications mentioned above: households often decide how much (or what) to 
consume out of some combined budget(s), committees and legislatures often make 
decisions over whether to spend today and tax tomorrow, or vice versa, etc.
It is important to note that it has long been recognized that aggregating prefer-
ences with heterogeneous discount factors introduces challenges. Marglin (1963) 
and Feldstein (1964) discovered the difficulty of deriving an appropriate aggregate 
time-independent discount rate for a planner facing a society of heterogeneous 
agents.6,7 For example, Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005) show that a representa-
tive agent has a time-varying discount factor if there is sufficient uncertainty and 
5 An analog of Zuber’s theorem can be deduced from our Theorem 2, since a common consumption stream can 
be nested in his domain, but the reverse is not true. 
6 More recent work in the context of household decisions, Bernheim (1999); Browning (2000); Mazzocco 
(2007); Hertzberg (2010); Abdellaoui, l’Haridon, and Paraschiv (2010); and Schaner (forthcoming), among oth-
ers, has considered the implications of preference heterogeneity on intertemporal consumption decisions under 
particular aggregation protocols. For instance, it illustrates that households may have hyperbolic preferences (in 
Hertzberg, 2010) and that commitment devices play a role in determining consumption patterns (in Mazzocco 2007, 
and Schaner forthcoming). 
7 Work by Weitzman (2001); Caplin and Leahy (2004); Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (2005); Gollier 
and Zeckhauser (2005); and Green and Hojman (2009) examines variations on such planner aggregation issues in 
more detail. See also Jamison and Jamison (2007), who distinguish between the speed and amount of discounting, 
and discuss some virtues of hyperbolic discounting. Farmer and Geanakoplos (2009) consider uncertainty as the 
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 heterogeneity in the environment. Jackson and Yariv (2014) show that utilitarian 
aggregation of common consumption streams must lead to a present-bias; a result 
that shows that a specific form of time inconsistency is exhibited by a particular, 
but common, form of collective utility function. They also present lab experimental 
evidence that subjects exhibit time inconsistencies when acting as social planners.
The novelty in our results on time inconsistency comes from showing that when-
ever agents differ in their discount factors, even in deterministic settings in which 
agents have identical instantaneous utility functions, time inconsistency must result 
from every non-dictatorial aggregation method respecting unanimity. Thus, our 
results illustrate that the phenomena identified in the literature are not unique to spe-
cific planner or representative agent formulations, but hold generally, and emerge 
even when there is only heterogeneity in discount factors.
The problems we study are also related to those pertaining to the aggregation of 
subjective preferences over lotteries: in a sense, a time-separable utility function 
(in particular, a time-consistent one) is analogous to a subjective expected utility 
function: time periods can be interpreted as states and the discount factors as a 
probability measure over those states (with an appropriate normalization). In that 
regard, our results are conceptually connected to work by Mongin (1995, 1998), 
who showed that it is impossible to aggregate heterogeneous subjective probabili-
ties into a common representative probability. Nonetheless, the domains in which 
the problems are embedded are very different. In particular, time discounting places 
a very specific restriction on the probabilities across states—they have to be pro-
portional to:  1 ,  δ ,  δ 2 , etc., whereas Mongin’s approach makes use of the fact that 
agents can have arbitrarily different orderings across states to derive conflicts in 
aggregation.8 Consequently, the results cannot be mapped into each other, and the 
techniques we use differ substantially. Even more importantly, the applications and 
implications are quite different.
With regard to our voting results, formal difficulties in aggregating preferences 
have been evident since Condorcet’s (1785) description of the voting paradox. 
These difficulties were crystallized via Arrow’s Theorem (1950, 1963). Later, obsta-
cles to aggregating convex preference relations over multidimensional (“spatial”) 
alternatives were pointed out by Plott (1967) and McKelvey (1976, 1979). Closest 
to our theorem on voting rules is that of Boylan and McKelvey (1995), who noted 
the intransitivities that may arise when majority voting is used in the context of 
consumption and saving problems and voters have varying time preferences. The 
current paper contributes to this strand of literature in that we show that, in the 
context of temporal decisions, aggregation is problematic even with a great deal 
of structure on individual preferences and the requirement that all agents consume 
the same stream of consumption. Our results concerning the intransitivity of voting 
rules apply to a wide class of procedures, containing majority rule as a special case. 
Moreover, beyond showing that there are issues with voting cycles, we also examine 
 foundations for hyperbolic discounting. Galperti and Stulovici (2014) provide an axiomatic foundation for hyper-
bolic discounting. Lengwiler (2005) considers the effects of time preference heterogeneity on asset prices. 
8  He also requires some additional continuity conditions to derive his results. 
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collective utility functions and show the general impossibility of time consistency, 
which is quite different from any of the above-mentioned papers.
Finally, our analysis of particular classes of aggregation methods (namely, welfare 
maximization or binary voting rules) has important implications for understanding 
observed anomalies in individual decision making. The literature documenting time 
inconsistencies and intransitivities is too vast to cover here.9 The idea that individ-
uals might be usefully thought of as having some internally heterogeneous prefer-
ences appears in a variety of places, possibly the most related of which is a recent 
paper by Green and Hojman (2009), which provides a general  revealed-preference 
welfare bound analysis allowing for such possibilities.10 A contribution of the cur-
rent paper is the insight that viewing individuals as nondegenerate collectives leads 
necessarily to behaviors exhibiting time inconsistency and/or intranstitivities in 
ways that are in line with empirical observations on a variety of dimensions.11
I. The Setting
A. Agents and consumption Streams
A set of agents,   = {1, … , n} , must make a collective decision over streams of 
common consumption.
The agents are infinitely lived and consume in discrete periods  t ∈ {1, 2,  …} . 
All of our results also hold for finite horizons.12
Each period’s common consumption  c t lies in  [0, 1] and a stream of consumption 
is denoted by  c  = ( c 1 ,  c 2 ,  …) ∈  [0, 1] ∞ .13
For expositional simplicity, we start by describing our results for  one-dimensional 
consumption. All agents have utility functions that are functions of the (same) 
stream. In terms of interpretation, it is not critical that consumption be common 
9 Some seminal references include Herrnstein (1961) and Thaler (1981) for time inconsistencies and Tversky 
(1969) for intransitivies. These phenomena seem fundamental in that they are observed in species other than 
humans as well. Time inconsistencies have been documented in rats and pigeons (see Ainslie 1975 and Rachlin 
2004). Intransitivies have been observed in bees, as in Shafir (1994) and jays, as in Waite (2001), where the jays 
exhibit intransitivies in settings very similar to the ones analyzed here (with distance substituting for time). For an 
overview, see, e.g., Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002). 
10 Some notable models with multiple personalities, preferences, or motives of agents include, among oth-
ers: Thaler and Shefrin (1981); O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999); Bernheim and Rangel (2004); Amador, Werning, 
and Angeletos (2006); Benabou and Tirole (2005); Brocas and Carrillo (2008); Fudenberg and Levine (2006); 
Evreny and Ok (2011); Ambrus and Rozen (2009); and Cherepanov, Feddersen, and Sandroni (2009). For a simple 
non-unitary discount model in a two-motive, CRRA utility setting, see Hori and Futagami (2012). In those settings, 
various forms of differences in preferences across time or state lead to a conflict between, e.g., current and future 
selves. This is in contrast to the current setting in which multiple individuals or selves collectively make a choice. 
11 The experimental and empirical evidence regarding whether individuals are themselves time-consistent is 
mixed. On the one hand, when faced with very simple decisions in the lab, many individual decision makers appear 
to be time-consistent (see Andreoni and Sprenger 2012a, b). On the other hand, time-inconsistent models of deci-
sion making appear to explain well a variety of real-world phenomena, ranging from saving behavior (Laibson 1997 
and Beshears et al. 2008) to physical exercise (della Vigna and Malmendier 2006). In conjunction, there is some 
recent evidence suggesting that individuals may discount different dimensions (such as, say, money and health) 
using different discount factors (see Chapman and Elstein 1995; Chapman et al. 2001, and references therein). 
12 The Proof of Theorem 1 requires there to be at least five periods, while all other results require a minimum of 
three periods (which is the minimal number of periods for which time consistency has bite). 
13 The uniform bound on consumption ensures that present values are well-defined (although it is only essential 
for the results that this be true of several periods, as seen in the proofs). Given the bound, the normalization to  [0, 1] 
is without further loss of generality. 
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per se, but rather that agents be able to evaluate their personal utility based on a 
collective decision. This would apply to a variety of examples as discussed above; 
for example, it would apply to any setting in which some entity (a government, a 
household, etc.) decides upon the allocation of a budget across time periods and 
agents can assess their individual resulting utilities conditional on the given budget 
in each period. So, it need not be the case that the budget is spent on public goods or 
common consumption. Of course, in the interpretation of multiple motives within a 
single person, the consumption truly is common.
In Section V, we show that our results extend to settings in which different indi-
viduals can consume different streams, some of which might be private or public.
B. Individual Agents
Each agent’s preferences are represented by a time additive discounted utility 
function. Agent  i has a discount factor  δ i ∈ (0, 1) and an increasing14 and twice 
continuously differentiable instantaneous utility function  u i :  [0, 1] → 핉 such that 
a consumption stream  C = ( c 1 ,  c 2 , …) ∈  [0, 1] ∞ is evaluated as
(1)   U i (C) =  ∑ 
t
  δ i t−1 u i ( c t ). 
Given that  u i is increasing and twice continuously differentiable, without loss of 
generality, we normalize all instantaneous utility functions such that  u i (0) = 0 and 
u i (1) = 1 . We let the set   denote the preferences  ( δ i ,  u i ) satisfying the conditions 
above.
A society of  n individuals is a profile  ( δ 1 ,  u 1 ; … ;   δ n ,  u n ) ∈    n . We sometimes 
slightly abuse notation and let  U i denote the corresponding  ( δ i ,  u i ) , so that a society 
can be denoted by  U = ( U 1 , … ,  U n ) ∈    n .
We examine the case in which all agents have “standard” (time discounted, addi-
tively separable) utility functions in order to show the difficulties in aggregation 
even with extremely well-behaved underlying preferences. Of course, allowing time 
inconsistency and/or intransitivities of these agents would lead to such conclusions 
in the aggregate a fortiori.15
C. collective Decisions
We consider two different ways of aggregating preferences: by a collective utility 
function and by a collective preference ordering.
collective Utility Functions.—A collective utility function is a function  V :    n × 
[0, 1] ∞ → 핉 .
14 Increasing is taken to mean strict. 
15 This specification has become the standard in the literature due to its time consistency properties. Thus, 
despite the strong restrictions imposed by the additive separability, it is important to understand its properties. Note 
that any enriched domain of possible consumption streams must face the impossibility results that we obtain here. 
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A collective utility function provides a “planner’s” utility function for a soci-
ety. Examples include taking a weighted average of the agents’ utility functions, 
 V [U ](C) =  ∑ i    w i U i (C) , as in a utilitarian approach, or considering the minimum 
of agents’ utilities,  V [U ](C) =  min i  U i (C) , as in a Rawlsian approach.
We sometimes abuse notation and, for a given society  U = ( δ 1 ,  u 1 ;  … .  δ n ,  u n ) , 
write  V(C) instead of  V[U ](C) to denote the collective utility for stream  C , omitting 
the explicit dependence on  U when it is fixed.
Social Welfare orderings and Voting.—The collective decision making of a soci-
ety might not be representable by a collective utility function. For example, when 
collective decisions are taken by a vote, they may result in choices between any pair 
of alternatives, which are not rationalizable by any collective utility function (par-
ticularly if choices turn out to be intransitive).
As such, it is also useful to consider a social welfare ordering as representing col-
lective behavior. This is a binary relation that represents the decision society would 
make between any given pair of consumption streams.
We denote the (weak) binary preference relation of a society by  r[U ] for any 
 U = ( δ 1 ,  u 1 , … ,  δ n ,  u n ) ∈    n . In some cases the social welfare orderings are com-
plete and reflexive, but that need not be the case.
The induced strict preference relation  P[U ] is defined as usual by
  C P[U ] C′ if
 C r[U ] C′ and not C′ r[U ] C .
One prominent example of such a preference relation is the case in which 
 CP[U]C′ if a strict majority of individuals prefer  C to  C′ , which corresponds to 
standard majority rule.
Note that any collective utility function induces a social welfare ordering, but 
clearly not the reverse.
II. Separable Aggregation of Preferences and Present-Bias
Before presenting our general results, we consider the important class of 
 time- separable collective utility functions. We show that this class of utility func-
tions exhibits a particular sort of time inconsistency: present-bias, which matches 
some evidence on behavior. This generalizes a result in Jackson and Yariv (2014) 
that shows that utilitarian collective utility functions must be present-biased (as 
defined below).
For any profile  ( δ 1 , u; … ;  δ n , u) ∈    n , a time-separable collective utility func-
tion takes the form
  V[ δ 1 , u; … ;  δ n , u](C) =  ∑ 
t
  δ ̃ t u( c t ), 
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where  u is some collective instantaneous utility function and  ( δ ̃ t ) are some time 
dependent weights, which may or may not correspond to exponential discounting. 
Standard utilitarian aggregation of individual utilities (or one that puts different 
weights on different individuals) is a special case.
Let  C[x, t] denote a consumption stream with  c t = x and  c  t ′  = 0 for  t′ ≠ t .
Present-Biased Collective Utility Functions: A collective utility function is 
 present-biased if:
	 •	 	V (C[x, t]) ≤ V (C [ y, t + k] ) implies  V (C [x, t + 1] ) ≤ V (C [ y, t + k + 1] ) 
for any  x, y , and  t ≥ 0 ,  k ≥ 1 , and
	 •	  For any  t ≥ 1 and  k ≥ 1 , there exist  x and  y such that  V (C[x, 1]) 
> V (C[ y, k + 1]) while  V (C[x, t + 1]) < V (C[ y, t + k + 1]) .
Present-bias implies that immediate consumption entails more impatience than 
delayed consumption. The first part of the definition implies that if consumption 
of  x at time  t is inferior to consumption of  y further delayed by  k periods, the same 
should be true when moved to time  t + 1 (i.e., after one period passes)—at least 
as much patience is exhibited with respect to delayed consumption as with respect 
to more immediate consumption . The second part of the definition requires that for 
some conceivable consumption streams reversals occur: at present, the immediate 
consumption is preferred, while delayed consumption is preferred when all choices 
are deferred (this description corresponds to that of Strotz 1955 and to the impul-
siveness notion described in Ainslie 1975).
We now show that if one simply imposes a separability condition as well as a 
weak Pareto efficiency condition (unanimity), then a present-bias is implied. Indeed, 
much of the empirical evidence suggesting time-inconsistent behavior (e.g., Strotz 
1955; Laibson 1997; della Vigna and Malmendier 2006, and references therein) has 
maintained the separable structure of preferences but found a time-dependent dis-
count factor (hyperbolic, or quasi-hyperbolic). As it turns out, whenever collective 
preferences take such a form, but still satisfy unanimity, they must be equivalent to 
maximizing a weighted sum of agents’ utility functions; which, in turn, generates a 
present bias.
For simplicity, the following result focuses on a case in which all agents, as well 
as the collective, share the same instantaneous utility function, thus highlighting the 
role of heterogeneity of time discounting.
As mentioned, a condition on a collective utility function that is useful in what 
follows is that of unanimity. It requires that if all agents prefer one stream to another, 
then the collective utility function should reflect that preference, a Pareto efficiency 
requirement.
Unanimity: A collective utility function  V satisfies unanimity if:
	 •	 	V[U ](C)  ≥  V[U]( ˆ  C) whenever  ∑ t    δ i t−1 u i ( c t )  ≥   ∑ t    δ i t−1 u i ( ˆ  c t) for all  i , and
	 •	 the	first	inequality	is	strict	whenever	the	second	is	strict	for	all		i .
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PROPOSITION 1: For any profile  ( δ 1 , u; … ;  δ n , u) ∈    n such that  u i = u for all  i , 
and  δ k ≠  δ j for some  k, j, a collective utility function of the form
(2)  V[ δ 1 , u; … ;  δ n , u](C) =  ∑ 
t
  δ ̃ t u( c t ) 
satisfies unanimity if and only if there exist nonnegative weights  w j ≥ 0 ( positive 
for at least one  j ) such that  δ ̃ t =  ∑ i   w i δ i t−1 for each  t , and so
  V[ δ 1 , u;  … ;  δ n , u](C) =  ∑ 
i
  w i U i (C). 
Also, such a  V is necessarily either dictatorial16 or present-biased.
The proof works by showing that in order to respect unanimity, the collective 
discount factor must be a weighted sum of the discount factors of the agents, and so 
must correspond to a weighted utilitarian collective utility function. The last conclu-
sion of the proposition then follows from Jackson and Yariv (2014), who show that 
a utilitarian collective utility function must either be dictatorial or present-biased.
The proposition encompasses many of the formulations of time-inconsistent 
preferences (e.g., hyperbolic, under which  δ ̃ t =  1 ____ a + bt, or quasi-hyperbolic, corre-
sponding to  δ ̃1 = 1 and  δ ̃ t = β δ t−1 for all  t > 1, etc.). As long as behavior has a 
separable structure and satisfies unanimity, the proposition shows that a present-bias 
is to be expected.
III. General Aggregation of Preferences
Although time-separable aggregation of utility functions exhibits a particular 
form of time inconsistency, it is conceivable that there are other forms of aggrega-
tion that are time-consistent. For example, would a Rawlsian method that maximizes 
the minimum utility be time-consistent? Would other collective utility functions that 
are based on order statistics or incorporate inequality aversion be time-consistent?
In this section, we show that there do not exist any non-dictatorial collective util-
ity functions that are time-consistent in societies where there is some heterogeneity 
in agents’ discount rates.
Two pieces of notation are useful.
Given  C ∈  [0, 1] ∞ and  c 1 ∈ [0, 1] , let  ( c 1 , C) denote the consumption stream  C′ 
such that  C 1 ′ =  c 1 and  C t ′ =  C t−1 for  t > 1 .
In addition, given  C, C′ ∈  [0, 1] ∞ , let  (C | t C′) denote the stream that corresponds 
to  C t for  τ ≤ t , and  C t ′ thereafter:  (C | t C′ ) τ =  C τ for  τ ≤ t and  (C | t C′ ) τ =  C τ ′ for τ > t .
16 That is,  V is an affine transformation of a collective utility function for which  w i > 0 for just one  i . 
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Time Consistency: The utility function  V is time-consistent if, for any society 
U = ( δ 1 ,  u 1 ;  .  .  .  .  δ n ,  u n ), all streams  C ,  C – ,  ˆ  C,  C ̃ , and times  0 ≤ t < t′ ≤ ∞ :17
	 •	 	V(C) > V( C – ) if and only if  V( c 1 , C) > V( c 1 ,  C – ) for any  c 1 ∈ [0, 1] ,
	 •	 	V(C | t ˆ  C| t′ C) > V( C – | t ˆ  C| t′  C – ) if and only if  V(C | t C ̃ | t′ C) > V( C – | t C ̃ | t′  C – ) .
Time consistency essentially imposes two conditions: stationarity, in the sense 
that rankings of consumption streams do not depend on when they occur; and inde-
pendence, in the sense that rankings of consumption streams do not depend on peri-
ods in which consumption levels coincide across the two consumption streams.18 
The first condition already embodies much of the flavor of the second condition. 
The fact that the ranking does not change when some consumption is placed in front 
of the sequence means that it is insensitive to what is placed in the first period (as 
long as it is the same in both streams). Indeed, using the first condition recursively 
t ′ times implies that  V( ˆ  C| t′ C) > V( ˆ  C| t′  C – ) if and only if  V( C ̃ | t′ C) > V( C ̃ | t′  C – ) , 
which is much of the essence of the second condition.19
The following background theorem adapts a powerful result from Koopmans 
(1960), which implies that whenever  V is sufficiently well-behaved, time consis-
tency is tantamount to the maximization of a standard time-separable and discounted 
utility function.20
THEOREM 1: [Koopmans (1960)] A collective utility function  V is continuous, 
time-consistent, and satisfies unanimity only if for each  U ∈    n , there exists 
δ ∈ (0, 1) and a continuous and increasing  u : [0, 1] → 핉 such that the prefer-
ences represented by  V[U ] coincide with those represented by
  ∑ 
t
  δ t−1 u( c t ). 
The details behind the adaptation of Koopmans’ (1960) results to our setting 
appear in the Appendix.21 We remark that a variation on this result could be used
17 For  t = 0 ,  (C | t  ˆ  C| t′ C) becomes  ( ˆ  C| t′ C) ; and for  t′ =  ∞ ,  (C | t  ˆ  C| t′ C) becomes  (C | t  ˆ  C) .18 There is a large literature that interprets time consistency in terms of behavioral plans (see, e.g., Kydland and 
Prescott 1977). This approach views an agent as consistent whenever plans of action are not overturned over time. 
Whenever consumption streams are evaluated in the same way in each period (so that agents do not have dated 
utility functions), the concepts are similar. 
19 Nonetheless, the conditions do not imply one another formally. For example, consider
 V( c 1 ,  c 2 , …) =  ∑ 
t=1
∞  e − ∑ k=1 t−1  c k   c t =  c 1 +  e − c 1  c 2 +  e − c 1 − c 2  c 3 + ⋯ 
This utility satisfies the first condition, but not the second. On the other hand, consider  V( c 1 ,  c 2 ,  .  .  . ) =  c 1 . It 
automatically satisfies the second condition, but not the first. 
20 We follow Koopmans (1960) and define continuity and differentiability using the sup metric  d(C,  C – ) 
=  sup t  | c t −  c –t | .
21 A partial converse holds:  ∑ t   δ t−1 u( c t ) is continuous and time-consistent, but not necessarily unanimous 
unless the collective discount factor  δ and collective instantaneous utility  u correspond to  δ i ,  u i for some agent  i (that 
is,  δ =  δ i and  u coincides with  u i up to an affine transformation). 
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to state our assumption on individuals’ preferences as continuity, monotonic-
ity, and time consistency (instead of explicitly assuming time-discounted utility 
functions).
Note that the theorem is an ordinal claim as  V could be any strictly monotonic 
transformation of  ∑ t   δ t−1 u( c t ) and still satisfy the axioms.
We now state our first main result. If there is any heterogeneity in temporal pref-
erences by way of differing discount factors, then the only well-behaved collective 
utility functions that are time-consistent and respect unanimity are dictatorial: they 
ignore the preferences of all but one agent (or a group of agents who share the same 
exact preferences).
THEOREM 2: consider a collective utility function  V that is continu-
ous, time- consistent, and satisfies unanimity so that by Theorem 1, for any 
 U = ( δ 1 ,  u 1 ; … ;   δ n ,  u n ) ∈    n ,  V[U ] represents the same preferences as  ∑ t   δ t−1 u( c t ) 
for some  δ ∈ (0, 1) and a continuous and increasing  u :  [0, 1] → 핉 . If  u is twice 
continuously differentiable, then there exists a single  i ∈  such that  δ =  δ i . 
Moreover, if  ( δ 1 ,  u 1 ; … ;  δ n ,  u n ) is such that if  δ j =  δ k for some  j ≠ k , then  u j is 
an affine transformation of  u k , then  u is an affine transformation of  u i and  V[U ] is 
dictatorial.
The theorem states that in order to be time-consistent and satisfy unanimity, the 
collective utility function must be a time-discounted sum of evaluations of the con-
sumption stream, where the collective discount factor must be exactly that of some 
agent  i . In fact, in that case, the collective utility function’s instantaneous utility 
function  u can only depend on the utility functions of the agents who have the same 
discount factor as  i . Thus, if agents are distinguished by their discount factors, then 
the collective utility function must be dictatorial. Alternatively, if a collective utility 
function responds nontrivially to at least two agents with differing time preferences 
and also respects unanimity, then it must be time-inconsistent.
In view of common impossibility results á la Arrow, we stress the quantifiers of 
the theorem. In the setting of Theorem 2, for any fixed profile of time preferences, 
unanimity and time consistency imply that only one agent’s preferences are paid 
attention to in determining the collective utility function. Note that this allows dif-
ferent preference profiles to involve different dictators. Nonetheless, the important 
implication is that if more than one agent’s preferences are paid attention to in a 
given scenario, then a society must be time-inconsistent in that scenario.
Instantaneous utility functions can be thought of as indirect utility functions of 
per period wealth that is then divided into various dimensions of private and public 
consumption. In fact, we return to a discussion of an extension of Theorem 2 to 
general multidimensional consumption vectors below. In some settings, consump-
tion streams can also be thought of as resulting from bargaining among the indi-
viduals comprising the group. In that case, whenever outcomes can be rationalized 
by a collective utility function, the theorem implies that the function cannot be 
simultaneously  time-consistent, Pareto efficient, and non-dictatorial. In particular, 
if one is to design Pareto efficient bargaining protocols resulting in  non-dictatorial 
and  time-consistent choices, then commitment tools are necessary. The theorem 
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illustrates that when observing ultimate choices, they necessarily appear either 
 time-inconsistent or dictatorial.
The Proof of Theorem 2 appears in the Appendix, and proceeds as follows. 
Theorem 1 establishes that an increasing and twice differentiable utility function 
that is time-consistent must be representable as a time-additive discounted sum of 
utility functions. There are then two things that remain to be shown: that the collec-
tive discount factor coincides with some agent’s discount factor, and that the collec-
tive instantaneous utility coincides with the instantaneous utility of that agent (up to 
an affine transformation). To show that the collective discount factor has to match 
some agent’s, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that the collective discount 
factor does not correspond to any of the agents’ discount factors. We show that this 
implies a violation of unanimity. This is very easy in some cases, for instance, in 
the case where the collective discount factor is strictly higher than all of the agents’ 
discount factors, so that it reflects more “patience.” We can then construct two con-
sumption streams such that one entails more immediate consumption (and thereby 
preferred by all agents) and one entails delayed consumption that is higher overall 
(and thereby ranked higher by the collective utility). An analogous construction can 
be done if the collective discount factor is lower than all of the agents’ discount fac-
tors. The difficult case is when the collective discount factor is inbetween the lowest 
and the highest of the agents’ discount factors. The construction then works off the 
following key insight. Agents who are less patient than the collective would like to 
have consumption moved forward more than the collective would. Furthermore, 
they are willing to have some consumption moved from intermediate periods to 
both earlier and later periods. More patient individuals would like consumption to 
be moved back in time more than the collective. Moreover, they are willing to have 
some consumption moved forward as long as enough consumption is also moved to 
later periods. In the proof, we construct two streams involving consumption in three 
periods such that one has higher consumption in the first and third periods relative 
to the other by just the right amounts, so that all agents prefer the former consump-
tion stream, while the collective utility function ranks it lower, in contradiction to 
unanimity.
A simple example illustrates the essence of how such a construction works. 
Consider a society of two agents, with  δ 1 = 0 and  δ 2 = 1 , and a collective 
utility function that uses the average discount factor,  δ avg = 1/2 .22 Suppose 
all agents have linear utility functions and that  C = (x, x, x, 0, 0, …) and 
 C′ = (x + ε, x − 6ε, x + 6ε, 0, 0, …) . Here,  U 1 (C) = x <  U 1 (C′ ) = x + ε 
 and  U 2 (C) = 3x <  U 2 (C′ ) = 3x + ε , so that both agents prefer  C′ to  C . However, 
 U  δ avg  (C) = 1.75x >  U  δ avg  (C′ ) = 1.75x − 0.5ε .
The details of the proof provide a general recipe for finding such reversals if the 
collective discount factor does not match any of the agents’ discount factors.23 We 
note that this construction requires only three periods.
22 We use extreme values of discount factors for illustrative purposes, but as the proof shows this can be done 
for any set of discount factors. 
23 Differentiability of the collective utility function allows us to assess the impacts of small changes in consump-
tion streams, as constructed in the example above. 
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The final step in the proof establishes that the collective (instantaneous) utility 
function must also match the utility function of the agent whose discount factor it 
matches (up to an affine transformation). This is done by a similar construction to 
that above: if not, then one can find a change that appeals to all the more and less 
patient individuals, as well as to the agent who has the same discount factor as the 
collective (because of his or her different utility function), which again contradicts 
unanimity.24
The heterogeneity in discount factors is critical to the results, and so it is hetero-
geneity in time preferences that is the culprit in necessitating time inconsistency. To 
see this, note that if a society is composed of agents who share the same discount 
factor,  δ 1 = ⋯ =  δ n ≡ δ , then there are many collective utility functions that 
are time-consistent and respect unanimity. In that case, for instance, the collective 
utility function defined by
  V[ δ 1 ,  u 1 ; … .  δ n ,  u n ](C) =  ∑ 
t
  δ t−1 u( c t ), where u( c t ) ≡  1 _n  ∑ 
i
  u i ( c t ) 
is non-dictatorial, unanimous, and time-consistent.
We stress that the result requires more than two periods of consumption. With 
only two periods, all agents agree that more consumption at each date is better; so 
the only potential disagreement stems from one stream offering more current con-
sumption and less future consumption than another. As an example, if all agents had 
the same utility function and only differed in terms of their patience, then using the 
average of the discount factors to discount the second period utility would satisfy 
unanimity and would induce a valid collective utility function satisfying the time 
consistency condition (when restricted to two periods).
To summarize, Theorem 2 illustrates the inevitability of time inconsistencies 
whenever consumption occurs over several periods and the population is heteroge-
neous in terms of temporal preferences. When time consistency is weakened to allow 
for discounted utility functions with time-varying discount factors, Proposition 1 
implies that a present-bias is inevitable.
IV. Voting over Consumption Streams
Although we have shown that there is no time-consistent and unanimous manner 
of nontrivial aggregation of heterogeneous time preferences in the form of a collec-
tive utility function, we should also ask whether a society might come to collective 
decisions that are “rational” collectively, without necessarily being representable by 
a collective utility function.
In this section, we show that making such choices by any of a general class of vot-
ing schemes that respect unanimity will be time-consistent, but must be intransitive. 
24 This construction is a bit more involved and requires positive consumption in at least five periods. In particu-
lar, an analogous claim to that of the theorem would hold for a society of agents contemplating consumption streams 
over any finite number of at least five periods. It may be possible to lower it to as few as three periods, although the 
proof’s details would necessarily differ. 
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In particular, we consider another common way by which groups make decisions 
collectively: by tallying which individuals prefer one option to another and mapping 
that set into a choice (for instance, by following majority rule or even weighted 
(non-anonymous) and/or supermajority voting rules).
Hypothetically, voting or some more general form of making collective binary 
choices might allow a representative or pivotal agent to be naturally determined. 
For instance, suppose that all the agents in a society have the same utility function  u 
and differ only in their discount factors. If society operated under standard majority 
rule, would it decide according to the utility corresponding to the median discount 
factor? After all, when considering societies of voters over unidimensional sets of 
alternatives, and where voters have single-peaked preferences, the preferences of 
the median agent coincide with decisions made by simple majority voting. As it 
turns out, this is not the case when voting is over time streams of consumption. 
The median discount factor does not represent a society’s voting behavior, nor does 
any particular discount factor. If any specific discount factor represented a society’s 
voting behavior, then the society’s voting behavior would have to be transitive. As 
we show below, for a rather wide class of voting rules, intransitivities are inherent, 
unless the set of potential consumption streams is severely limited.
Before presenting our next main result, we present an example illustrating the 
underlying forces that generate cycles in collective decisions.
Example (Cycles in Collective Decisions): Suppose a group is composed of 3 indi-
viduals sharing the same instantaneous utility function  u i (c) = c for  i = 1, 2, 3 , 
but having different discount factors:  δ 1 = 0,  δ 2 =  1 _2, and  δ 3 = 1. Consider the 
following three consumption streams:
  C = (x, x, x, 0, 0, …),
 C′ = (x + ε, x − 6ε, x + 6ε, 0, 0, …),
 C′′ = (x + 2ε, x − 6ε, x + 3ε, 0, 0, …), 
for some  ε > 0. 
The most impatient individual is concerned only with period  1 consumption, so that
  U 1 (C) = x <  U 1 (C′ ) = x + ε <  U 1 (C′′ ) = x + 2ε. 
The moderately patient individual is concerned with earlier consumption and its 
distribution over time and displays preferences:
  U 2 (C′ ) = 1.75x − 0.5ε <  U 2 (C′′ ) = 1.75x −  0.25ε <  U 2 (C) = 1.75x. 
The most patient individual is concerned with the overall sum of consumptions and so
  U 3 (C′′ ) = 3x − ε <  U 3 (C) = 3x <  U 3 (C′ ) = 3x + ε. 
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If these agents vote by majority rule, a cycle would emerge: Individuals  1 and  3 
prefer  C′ to  C, individuals  1 and  2 prefer  C′′ to  C′, and individuals  2 and  3 prefer  C 
to  C′′ .
The example illustrates three dimensions that individuals may care about that are 
the basis for the cycle: immediate consumption, overall consumption, and the dis-
tribution of consumption across time. The latter dimension is particularly important 
when instantaneous utility functions are strictly concave, and we next show that, 
whenever this is the case, the type of disagreements generating cycles in the exam-
ple are quite general, even when the set of alternatives is very restricted.
A. Intransitivities of Binary Voting rules
We generalize the example above. We define a general class of binary voting 
rules that depend only on the set of agents who prefer either of two alternatives in 
determining the one chosen. This allows for non-anonymous and non-neutral vot-
ing rules, such as weighted voting rules and/or those that favor some  alternatives 
over others. While simple majority rule, which is within this class, may be the most 
commonly used, this setup allows for a variety of other rules that are used in prac-
tice. For instance, it allows for the type of rules used in the executive council of 
the European Union, where countries have different weights, and approving some 
proposals (in lieu of maintaining the status quo) requires a total weight exceeding 
50 percent of the overall weights cast.25
Formally, for any  C, C′ , let  p(C, C′, U ) denote the set of individuals who strictly 
prefer  C to  C′ :
  p(C, C′, U ) =  {i| U i (C) >  U i (C′ )} . 
Let a Binary Voting rule be a collective social welfare ordering  r[U ] that is com-
plete26 and depends only on the information in  p . That is, if
  p(C, C′, U) = p(C, C′, U′ ) and p(C′, C, U) = p(C′, C, U′ ) 
then
  Cr[U]C′ if and only if Cr(U′ )C′. 
This condition embodies a variation of Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives, as it requires that comparisons only respond to the set of agents pre-
ferring one consumption stream to another. It also embodies an ordinality condition 
that is inherent in Arrow’s setting, and related to various versions of “neutrality” 
conditions appearing in the single profile literature (see, e.g., Parks 1976 and Roberts 
25 See Barberà and Jackson (2006) for a discussion of the optimality of voting rules other than simple majority, 
as well as for additional references and background. 
26 So, for every  U ,  c and  c ′ , either  cr[U ]c ′ or  c′ r[U ]c . 
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1980).27 It states that the only information that matters in determining whether one 
consumption stream is preferred to another is information about which agents prefer 
each of the two alternatives being compared. Clearly, most of the commonly used 
voting rules satisfy this condition: majority rule, any weighted voting rule, even vot-
ing rules that favor certain alternatives (where, say, choosing certain consumption 
streams requires specific quorums).
The question is then whether allowing for ordinal collective preferences rather 
than cardinal ones can allow for a society to be represented by a transitive and 
time-consistent social welfare ordering.
Locally Non-Dictatorial Orderings: A social welfare ordering  r is locally 
non-dictatorial if
  Cr[U]C′ whenever  |p(C, C′, U )| ≥ n − 1. 
A social welfare ordering is locally non-dictatorial if whenever at least all but one 
agent prefer one consumption stream to another, then so does society. Therefore, 
locally, at any particular choice, there is no single agent who can force society’s 
preference when all others have an opposing preference. Any (weighted) super- 
majoritarian voting rule short of unanimity is locally non-dictatorial.
Consider  x > 0 and  γ > 0 and define a set of consumption streams by
  C(x, γ) =  {C |  c 1 +  c 2 / γ +  c 3 / γ 2 = x,  c t = 0 ∀ t > 3} . 
These are three-period consumption streams in which an initial amount of the con-
sumption good  x is to be split over three periods and grows (or depreciates) at a 
gross rate  γ > 0 between periods, so that a unit stored in one period becomes  γ 
units in the following period. If  γ = 1, then units are exactly stored across periods; 
if  γ < 1, then there is depreciation; and if  γ > 1, then there is a positive growth or 
return to investment across periods.
By restricting the set of alternatives to this simple set, we make it more diffi-
cult to find voting cycles since the set of admissible consumption streams are quite 
constrained.
Our main result in this section is that any binary voting rule that is locally 
 non-dictatorial is intransitive in a very strong sense, even when restricting attention 
to this set of consumption streams over a short horizon.
We say that a strictly concave utility function ( u i = u for all  i ) is non-extreme (relative to (x, γ)) if there is at least one discount factor  δ ∈ (0, 1) for which there 
is a maximizing consumption stream  C ∗ (u) = arg  max C∈C(x, γ)  ∑ t   δ t−1 u( c t ) that is 
interior.28 Let    ∗ ⊂    n denote profiles of preferences for which  u i = u for all  i , for 
some non-extreme and strictly concave utility function  u .
27 Note that “neutrality” is a bit of a misnomer originating from that literature, since it entails something very 
different from the usual usage of neutrality that refers to an insensitivity to the labeling of alternatives. 
28 Note that this is unique given the differentiability and strict concavity of the utility function. The interiority is 
satisfied, for example, if  δ/γ ≤ 1 and  u′(1/2) < u′(0) (δ/γ) 2 or if  δ/γ ≥ 1 and  u′(1/2) (δ/γ) 2 < u′(0) .
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Recalling that  P[U ] corresponds to the strict preference induced by  r[U ] , the 
following holds.
THEOREM 3: consider consumption streams in C (x, γ) for any  x > 0 and  γ > 0 . 
If a binary voting rule  r is locally non-dictatorial, then there exists a profile  U ∈    ∗ 
and consumption streams for which  r is intransitive. In fact, for any neighborhood 
B ⊂ C  (x, γ) of  C ∗ (u) (as defined above), there exists  C′ ∈ B and  C′′ ∈ B such 
that  C ∗ (u)r[U ]C′r[U ]C′′P[U ] C ∗ (u) .
The theorem states that for any utility function such that a most preferred con-
sumption stream for some possible time preference is interior, and any local neigh-
borhood of that consumption stream, one can find a profile of discount factors for 
the agents such that there is a voting cycle within that neighborhood. Although 
intransitivities are within a set of alternatives pertaining to consumption smoothing 
over only three periods, under the theorem’s conditions, intransitivities also arise 
for consumption smoothing problems with longer horizons, or when consumption 
streams are less restricted.
The conclusions of the theorem depend on the strict concavity of the utility func-
tion. If, for example, all agents have the same linear utility function then, under these 
restrictions on consumption, the agent with the median discount factor’s favorite allo-
cation (generally, to have all consumption either at date 1 or 3 depending on  γ ), is a 
Condorcet winning alternative and cycles disappear. Indeed, in the example above, the 
three consumption streams did not correspond to a consumption smoothing problem.
The theorem extends without strict concavity if we loosen the restrictions on the 
consumption streams. We show this for majority rule, but the proof makes it clear 
that it extends easily to other voting rules.
Society makes choices using simple majority rule if  C is (weakly) preferred to  ˆ  C
whenever at least half the society weakly prefers  C to  ˆ  C:
  Cr[U] ˆ  C if  | {i :  U i (C) ≥  U i ( ˆ  C)} | ≥ n/2. 
PROPOSITION 2: If  n ≥ 3 ,  u i = u for all  i , where  u is continuous and strictly 
increasing,  P is defined by majority rule, and the largest group of agents having 
identical discount factors is smaller than  n/2 , then  P[U ] is intransitive.
The proof of this proposition illustrates that any agent can be made the “pivotal 
voter.” To glean some intuition for the workings of the proof, let us show how to 
identify consumption streams  C and  C′ , such that individuals   1 prefer consump-
tion stream  C to  C′ and individuals   2 prefer  C′ to  C. There is a corresponding 
system of linear inequalities. Namely,
  ∑ 
t
  δ i t−1 [u( c t ) − u( c t ′ )] > 0 for i ∈   1 
  ∑ 
t
  δ i t−1 [u( c t ) − u( c t ′ )] < 0 for i ∈   2 . 
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Now, if discount factors are all different, then whenever the range of  u is sufficiently 
rich, the linear independence of  { (1,  δ i ,  δ i 2 , …) } 
i
 guarantees a solution.
The proof, much like the intuition, uses the richness of the set of consumption 
plans (and the resulting richness of the instantaneous utility function’s range). 
Restricting consumption streams to those corresponding to consumption smooth-
ing problems does not avoid intransitivities—as long as utility functions are strictly 
concave, Theorem 3 guarantees that interior solutions of some agents are associated 
with intransitivities.
Note that the voting cycles captured in Proposition 2 are driven by the lin-
ear independence of the vectors of coefficients of the sequence of discount fac-
tors  { (1,  δ i ,  δ i 2 , …) } 
i
 . In fact, as long as there is enough dependence between these 
vectors (relative to the potential instantaneous utility functions and admissible con-
sumption streams), voting does not entail intransitivies.
B. Well-ordered consumption Streams
One way to introduce such dependence is to require alternatives to be  well-ordered. 
Consumption streams  C and  ˆ  C are well-ordered relative to a society with discount 
factors  δ 1 , … ,  δ n and a utility function  u i = u for all  i if  u( c t ) − u( ˆ  c t) is monotone 
in  t (either nonincreasing, or nondecreasing).
Well-ordering provides a strong linkage between the preferences of individuals. 
Intuitively, suppose that  C and  ˆ  C are well-ordered and that, say,  u( c t ) − u( ˆ  c t) is 
increasing. Calculating differences in net present values between  C and  ˆ  C involve 
sums of the form
  ∑ 
t
  δ t−1 (u( c t ) − u( ˆ  c t)) . 
As we increase  δ, more weight is put on elements further in the sequence 
 {u( c t )  −  u( ˆ  c t)} t and so whenever an agent with a discount factor of  δ evaluates this 
expression as positive (so that  C is preferred to  ˆ  C) so does any agent with a higher 
discount factor. In particular, there is a natural ordering of agents according to their 
discount factors. Consequently, restricting the set of consumption streams so that 
agents are well-ordered rules out voting cycles.
A detailed analysis of well-ordered consumption streams appears in the supple-
mentary online Appendix.
V. General Consumption Patterns
Up to this point, we considered situations in which each agent’s consumption 
was common and one-dimensional. In some contexts it may be useful for a planner 
to be able to evaluate consumption streams that involve combinations of public and 
private consumptions. Similarly, in many applications in which agents use voting 
mechanisms, alternatives impact several dimensions of consumption. As it turns out, 
our results extend directly to settings in which consumption is multidimensional.
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Specifically, denote a stream of consumption by  C = ( c 1 ,  c 2 , …) , where each 
c t ∈  [0, 1] ℓ for some positive integer  ℓ .
A special case is where  ℓ = 1 , which reduces to our original formulation. 
Another special case is where  ℓ = n and each agent has a private consumption 
stream. The general case allows for any combination, where some streams are eval-
uated by some subsets of agents, and others are private. This allows for agents to be 
bargaining over streams of consumption, as their utility function need only increase 
in their own consumption. In particular, an agent could be made worse off by an 
increase in another agent’s consumption, or even by an increase in a public ele-
ment of consumption, if it comes at the expense of a decrease in the agent’s private 
consumption.
A. Aggregation and Time Inconsistency
The definition of a collective utility function, time consistency, and unanimity are 
exactly as before (as none of them depended on the dimensionality of  c t ).
We require each  u i to be twice continuously differentiable, nondecreasing overall, 
and increasing in at least one dimension of  c t .29
The following is a variation of Theorem 2 above.30
THEOREM 4: consider a collective utility function  V that is continuous, time- 
consistent, and satisfies unanimity. Then, for any  U = ( δ 1 ,  u 1 ; … ;  δ n ,  u n ) as above, 
V[U ] represents the same preferences as  ∑ t   δ t−1 u( c t ) for some  δ ∈ (0, 1) and a 
continuous and increasing  u : [0, 1] → ℜ . If  u is twice continuously differentiable, 
then at a profile of preferences such that agents all have different discount factors, 
V is dictatorial.
The proof of Theorem 4 can be achieved using techniques similar to those used 
in the proof of Theorem 2 and is therefore omitted.31
B. Voting with General consumption Patterns
We now consider majoritarian voting rules when agents’ consumption is mul-
tidimensional. Let us say that utility functions are weakly similar if there exists  u 
such that for every  i , there exist nonnegative scalars  a i and  b i such that  u i (x1)  =   a i  +  b i u(x1) for all scalars  x .
Note that weak similarity allows for different agents to care about different dimen-
sions of the consumption stream, and to embody separate private  consumptions. It 
29 The utility function  u i is nondecreasing overall if whenever  c ≥  c ′ (so that  c j ≥  c j ′ for every  j ),  u i (c) ≥  u i (c′ ). 
30 We define continuity and differentiability using the sup metric with the Euclidean norm:  d(c,  c –) 
=  sup t  ‖ c t −  c –t ‖ .
31 The result of Koopmans (1960) still applies and step 1 of the proof works simply by considering consumption 
streams where all elements of  c t are identical (effectively corresponding to the common consumption case). Step 2 
is then slightly more involved, working with gradients instead of derivatives, but analogous. The detailed proof 
appears in the supplementary online Appendix. 
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only imposes restrictions when all elements of the consumption stream are moved 
together in unison.
PROPOSITION 3: If  n ≥ 3 and  ( u 1 ; …;  u n ) are weakly similar through some  u 
that is continuous and strictly increasing, then if  P is defined by majority rule, and 
 ( δ 1 ; … ;  δ n ) is such that the largest group of agents having identical discount factors 
is smaller than a majority, then  P[ δ 1 ,  u 1 ; … ;  δ n ,  u n ] is intransitive.
We omit the proof of this proposition since it follows directly from the intransitiv-
ity on the restricted domain of consumptions in which each dimension has the same 
consumption level (but consumption may vary across dates). A similar generaliza-
tion of Theorem 3 also holds in this setting.
VI. Concluding Remarks
The main message of this paper is that the aggregation of heterogeneous prefer-
ences over consumption streams in a non-dictatorial manner that respects unanimity 
is bound to exhibit time inconsistencies or intransitivities.32 This insight is relevant 
for decisions that are made by groups of individuals as well as ones made by one 
person juggling an assortment of temporal motives.
The results are important for policymaking when heterogeneous temporal pref-
erences are present in the population. Marglin (1963) and Feldstein (1964) sug-
gested that choosing a sensible representative agent may involve nonstationary 
discount rates, and recent work has examined the implications of time inconsistency 
in the population on optimal policies (see, e.g., Amador, Werning, and Angeletos 
2006). The results in this paper indicate that such considerations are unavoidable. 
Policymakers who trade-off different temporal preferences of individuals in any non-
trivial way de facto face a time-inconsistent representative agent. In fact, if policy-
makers care about some proxy of (utilitarian) efficiency, they face a  present-biased 
representative agent. In addition, the results suggest that even when estimated pref-
erences pertaining to groups (say, households) exhibit time inconsistencies, they 
may arise from individual preferences, potentially time-consistent, that differ from 
the collective’s. Therefore, welfare maximization requires a careful analysis with 
the primitive preferences taken into account, and not simply substituted by a nonex-
istent representative agent.
The results also open the door for considering specific bargaining protocols in 
groups with heterogeneous time preferences (such as households trading off con-
sumption and savings within a budget constraint, political committees deciding 
on investments over time while being restricted in resources, etc.). Whenever such 
protocols allow for outcomes rationalizable through a collective utility function, 
our results suggest that the function will either be time-inconsistent or engage the 
32 Effectively there is a tradeoff. A cardinal method will produce transitive choices since it necessarily induces 
an ordering. However, it will generate time inconsistencies if non-dictatorial. Instead, an ordinal method derived 
from some voting procedure will produce time-consistent choices (since the agents are time-consistent and will not 
change their votes over time). However, it will be prone to intransitivities. 
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 preferences of only one individual. The precise characterization of outcomes gener-
ated by such protocols is likely to require new tools and techniques.33
Appendix: Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
We first show the claim in the first sentence of the proposition. It is clear that 
if there exist nonnegative weights  w i such that  V =  ∑ i   w i U i , then unanimity is 
satisfied. Let us show the converse. We show that there exists a vector  w ∈  Δ  =  {w| w i ∈ [0, 1] ∀ i,  ∑ i   w i = 1} such that  δ ̃ t = λ  ∑ i   w i δ i t−1 for some  λ > 0 . 
We show that if this is not the case, then we contradict unanimity.
Let
   =  {x ∈  핉 + ∞ : ∃ w ∈  Δ  , λ ≥ 0 s.t. x = λ  ∑ i  w i (1,  δ i ,  δ i 2 , …) } , 
and
    T =  {x ∈  핉 + T : ∃ w ∈  Δ  , λ ≥ 0 s.t. x = λ  ∑ i  w i (1,  δ i ,  δ i 2 , … ,  δ i T ) } . 
Suppose that  ( δ ̃ t ) t ∉  . It follows that  ( δ ̃1 , … ,  δ ̃T ) ∉    T for some  T < ∞ . 
Note that    T is a closed and convex set containing the  0 vector. By the Separating 
Hyperplane Theorem, there exists a vector  y ∈  ℜ T such that  y · x ≥ 0 for all 
 x ∈    T and  y · ( δ ̃1 ,  … ,  δ ̃T ) < 0 .
To obtain strict inequalities on the relevant vectors of discount factors, we slightly 
perturb  y . In particular, normalizing  y given the finite dimension  (by simply divid-
ing all entries by 2 max i | y i |) , we can take  y ∈  [−1/2, 1/2] T . For  ε < 1/2 , let 
 y(ε) = ( y 1 +ε,  y 2 ,  y 3 , … ,  y T ) , so that  y(ε) ∈  [−1, 1] T . It follows that for small 
enough  ε ,
(3)  ∑ 
t≤T
 δ i t−1 y (ε) t > 0 for i = 1, … , n,
  ∑ 
t≤T
 δ ̃ t y (ε) t < 0. 
33 Indeed, one difficulty that arises in such settings is that even when considering an underlying problem of 
wealth distribution at each period, effectively a per period zero sum game, the overall time discounted game is not 
zero sum whenever individual discount factors are heterogeneous since agents can trade consumption across time (a 
point noted in the repeated games literature, see Lehrer and Pauzner 1999 and Lehrer and Yariv 1999). 
172 AMErIcAN EcoNoMIc JoUrNAL: MIcroEcoNoMIcS NoVEMBEr 2015
Given that  u is increasing and continuous, its range is  [0, 1] . Therefore, there exist 
sequences  C = ( c 1 , …  c T , 0, 0, …) and  C′ = ( c 1 ′ , …  c T ′ , 0, 0,  … ) such that 
 u( c t ) − u( c t ′) = y (ε) t . For these  C and  C′ ,
(4)  ∑ 
t≤T
 δ i t−1 [u( c t ) − u( c t ′ )] > 0 for i = 1, … , n,
  ∑ 
t≤T
 δ ̃ t [u( c t ) − u( c t ′ )] < 0.   
Thus, all individual agents prefer consumption stream  C to  C′, while the collective 
prefers  C′ to  C, violating unanimity. It follows that our supposition was incorrect 
and  ( δ ̃ t ) t ∈  . Note that since  ( δ ̃ t ) t ≠ 0 , it follows that  λ > 0 .
The second sentence of the proposition follows from Jackson and Yariv (2014), 
who show that weighted utilitarian collective utility functions that put positive weight 
on at least two individuals with differing discount factors are present-biased.34 ∎
PROOF OF THEOREM 1:
We apply a theorem by Koopmans (1960, section 14). First note that by the fact 
that each  u i is increasing on  [0, 1] and  V satisfies unanimity, his postulates 2 and 5 
are satisfied. Next, his postulate 1 follows from continuity of  V under the metric 
 d(C, C′ ) =  sup t  | c t −  c t ′| . Finally, time consistency implies his postulates 3, 3’, and 4. 
Thus, there exists  0 < δ < 1 and a continuous and increasing35  u , such that 
 ∑ t   δ t−1 u( c t ) for all  C represents the same preferences as  V[U ] . ∎
PROOF OF THEOREM 2:
Let  W(C) =  ∑ t   δ t−1 u( c t ) represent the preferences induced by  V[U ] .
Without loss of generality, normalize  u so that  u(0) = 0 and  u(1) = 1 . Since 
the same is already true for each  u i , any agents who have utility functions that are 
affine transformations of each other have identical utility functions. Similarly for 
any agent whose utility functions are affine transformations of the social planner’s.
Step 1: There exists  i such that  δ =  δ i .
Proof of Step 1: Suppose to the contrary that  δ ≠  δ i for all  i .
For any  0 < x < 1, consider  C = (x, x, …) and
  C ε =  (x + ε(1 − γ), x − 2 ε _δ, x +  ε __  δ 2 , x, x …) , 
where  ε > 0 .
34 Note that in that result,  ∑ i   w i = 1 , but this can be rescaled via  λ .
35 The increasing nature of  u follows from the unanimity and increasing  u i s. 
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From Taylor’s approximation, for any  i :
  U i ( C ε ) =  U i (C) + ε u i ′(x) [ (1 −   δ i  __δ) 
2
 − γ] + o ( ε 2 ) . 
Select  γ so that
  0 < γ <  min 
i
  (1 −   δ i  __δ) 
2
 , 
which is possible given our supposition that  δ ≠  δ i for all  i . It follows that
  U i ( C ε ) >  U i (C) 
for all  i and sufficiently small  ε . Note, however, that  W( C ε ) is approximately
 W( C ε ) = W(C) − γεu′(x) + o ( ε 2 ) , 
and so for  ε small enough, unanimity is violated, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, there exists  i such that  δ =  δ i .
Step 2: If any agents who have the same discount factor also have the same utility 
function, then  u =  u i , where  i is an agent with discount factor of  δ i = δ .
Proof of Step 2: Suppose the contrary, so that  δ i = δ and yet  u ≠  u i (so under 
our normalization, these are not affine transformations of each other). Then, there 
exists  0 < x < 1 ,  0 < y < 1, and  α > 0 such that   u i ′(x) ___ u i ′(y) > α >  
u′(x) ___
u′(y).
Set  C = (x, x, x, y, x, x …) and
  C ε =  (x + ε, x − 2 ε _δ, x +  ε __  δ 2 , y − αγε, x +  
γε __δ , x, x …) , 
for  ε > 0. 
As before, for any  j such that  δ j ≠  δ i , 
  U j ( C ε ) =  U j (C) + ε [ (1 −   δ j  __δ) 
2
 +  γ δ j 
4  ___δ ]  u j ′(x) − αγε δ j 3 u j ′(y) + o ( ε 2 ) . 
Since  δ j ≠ δ, for sufficiently small  ε and  γ =  √ _ ε ,  U j ( C ε ) >  U j (C) .
By a similar argument,
  W( C ε ) = W(C) −  δ 3 γε [αu′(y) − u′(x)] + o ( ε 2 ) , 
while  U i ( C ε ) can be written as
  U i ( C ε ) =  U i (C) −  δ 3 γε [α u i ′(y) −  u i ′(x)] + o ( ε 2 ) . 
174 AMErIcAN EcoNoMIc JoUrNAL: MIcroEcoNoMIcS NoVEMBEr 2015
For sufficiently small  ε and  γ =  √ _ ε, it follows that  W( C ε ) < W(C) and  U i ( C ε ) >  U i (C) . Given that we have already established that  U j ( C ε ) >  U j (C) for all  j ≠ i 
for who  δ j ≠  δ i (and the others have the same preferences as i), this violates una-
nimity. Therefore, our supposition was incorrect and  u =  u i . ∎
PROOF OF THEOREM 3:
Suppose that  C ∗ is interior and optimal for  δ ∗ , so that
  u′( c 1 ∗) = u′( c 2 ∗) δ ∗ γ = u′( c 3 ∗) ( δ ∗ γ) 2 . 
Let  C[a, b] = ( c 1 ∗ + a/γ,  c 2 ∗ − a − b,  c 3 ∗ + γb, 0, …) .
For small  a and  b ,  U i (C[a, b]) is approximately  (up to expressions of o ( a 2 ) , 
o ( b 2 ) ) ,
(5)  U i ( C ∗ ) +  u′( c 1 
∗) ____γ [a (1 −   δ i  __ δ ∗  ) − b   δ i  __ δ ∗  (1 −   δ i  __ δ ∗  ) ] . 
CLAIM:  There exist small  a′, b′ and  a″, b″ such that  C[a′, b′ ], C[a″, b″ ] ∈ B , and 
for any linear ordering over  C ∗ ,  C[a′, b′ ], and  C[a″, b″ ], there is a discount factor 
that implies that linear ordering of preferences. So, there is a set  Δ of six discount 
factors that result in any ordering over these three alternatives.
Restricting attention to  C ∗ ,  C[a′, b′ ],  C[a″, b″ ], and preference profiles with dis-
count factors in  Δ , we can apply Arrow’s theorem to conclude that any binary vot-
ing rule that is unanimous and non-dictatorial on this domain of preferences and 
relative to these consumption streams (both these conditions implied by the local 
no-dictator condition) is intransitive over these three alternatives and the domain of 
preferences composed of profiles where agents all have discount factors in  Δ . The 
proposition then follows directly.
PROOF OF CLAIM:
Find  x such that  1 < x < 1/ δ ∗ and set  [a′, b′ ] = [xε, ε] and  [a″, b″ ] = [ε, xε] 
for some small  ε (small enough to ensure  C[a′, b′] and  C[a″, b″ ] are interior and sat-
isfy the restrictions below).
First, let us find  δ ’s that entail  C ∗ being ranked as most preferred and the other 
two consumption streams second and third, in either order. By the continuity 
of preferences, for  δ near enough to  δ ∗ ,  C ∗ is most preferred and  C[a″, b″ ] and 
 C[a′, b′ ] lead to (nearly) the same, but lower, utility. For  δ i <  δ ∗ the relative utility 
of  C[a′, b′ ] rises relative to  C[a″, b″ ] since  (1 −   δ i  __  δ ∗ ) is positive (see equation (5)), 
while the reverse happens as  δ i >  δ ∗ since  (1 −   δ i  __  δ ∗ ) is then negative. We choose 
δ 1 ,  δ 2 such that  δ 1 <  δ ∗ <  δ 2,  and both are close enough to  δ ∗ to preserve the top 
ranking of  C ∗ relative to the other two consumption streams, but imply a different 
ranking of  C[a″, b″ ] and  C[a′, b′ ] .
VoL. 7 No. 4 175Jackson and Yariv: collective dYnamic choice & time inconsistencY
Next, let us find  δ s that induce  C[a′, b′ ] as the most preferred of the three 
streams, and rank the other two consumption streams in an arbitrary order. Consider 
 δ′ =  δ ∗ /x . It follows from (5) that under  δ′ <  δ ∗ ,  C[a′, b′ ] is most preferred and is 
nearly, except for second-order effects for small enough  ε , indifferent between the 
other two consumption streams. Moreover, we can find  δ 3 slightly smaller than  δ′ 
inducing  C ∗ to be preferred to  C[a″, b″ ] , and  δ 4 slightly larger than  δ′ inducing the 
reverse, both while still maintaining  C[a′, b′ ] as the most preferred.
By an analogous argument, we can find  δ 5 implying  C[a″, b″ ] being preferred 
to  C ∗ that is preferred to  C[a′, b′ ] , and  δ 6 implying  C[a″, b″ ] being preferred to 
C[a′, b′ ] that is preferred to  C ∗ . The specification of  Δ = { δ 1 ,  … ,  δ 6 } completes 
the proof. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
By the suppositions in the proposition, and by ordering agents in nondecreasing 
order of discount factors, we end up with groups   1 ,  … ,   K such that the groups 
collect the agents with identical discount factors.
Let
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where the labeling is such that each of the discount factors  δ 1 ,  … ,  δ K is distinct. 
Since  δ i ≠  δ j for all  i, j, the matrix  D is invertible. In particular, the system  Dx = a 
has a solution for any vector  a ∈  핉 K . 
Find  k 1 ,  k 2 , and  k 3 partitioning the agents according to their discount factors, such 
that agents with the lowest  k 1 discount factors form one group, the next  k 2 discount 
factors form another group, and the last  k 3 discount factors form the third group, and 
such that any two groups form a strict majority. For  b  >  0, consider the following 
vectors:
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and let  x 1 , … ,  x 3 be defined so that  D x i =  a i for all  i = 1,  … , 3. 
Notice that  ∑ i=1 3  a i = 0, so that  ∑ i=1 3  x i = 0 (given the invertibility of  D and 
the fact that  D  ∑ i=1 3  x i =  ∑ i=1 3  a i = 0 ).
Define now the sequence of consumption streams  C 1 ,  … ,  C 3 , as follows:
 
 C 1  =  (1/2, … , 1/2, 0, …)
   C 2  =   ( u −1 (u ( c 1 1) −  x 1 1) , … ,  u −1 (u ( c k 1 )  −   x k 1 ) , … ,  u −1 (u ( c K 1)  −   x K 1) , 0, 0, …) 
 C 3  =   ( u −1 (u ( c 1 2)  −   x 1 2) , … ,  u −1 (u ( c k 2 )  −   x k 2 ) , … ,  u −1 (u ( c K 2) −  x K 2) , 0, 0, …) .
 
Given the fact that  u is increasing and continuous, this can be done for small 
enough  b .
Note that, by construction, for any  t  ≤  n ,  u ( c t j )  −  u ( c t j+1 )  =   x t j for  j  =  1, … , 3 . 
Since  ∑ i=1 3 x i = 0, it follows that  u ( c t 3 ) − u ( c t 1 ) =  x t 1 . 
In particular,
  C 1 P[U ] C 2 P[U ] C 3 P[U ] C 1 , 
which is what we wanted to show. ∎
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